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PREFACE 
One of the major long run tasks of the Human Settlements 
and Services Research Area at IIASA is Human Settlement Systems: 
Development Processes and Strategies. The purpose of this task 
is to establish and use a framework of functional urban regions 
to provide a better understanding of the impact of public policies 
on population distribution and economic activity. Although 
evaluations have been made of such pclicies, there is a lac!: of 
comparable data sets among countries. Xoreover, the validity 
of conceptual models from which human settlement policies have 
taken their orientation is highly questionable. In particular, 
these models have neglected the role of multilocational organi- 
zations in the transmission of growth within systems of cities. 
This study by Allan Pred represents a significant contriSution 
to our understanding of how growth processes actually operate 
within urban systems. 
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ABSTRACT 
It is proposed that the disappointing record of growth-center 
and growth-pole policies in advanced econonies is in sone neasure 
attributable to mistaken assu~zptions concerning interurban growth 
transmission. The reasoning behind the hinterland and hierar- 
chical diffusion assumptions of interurban growth transmission 
is outlined and briefly criticized. The relationships between 
the spatial structure of organizations and interurban growth- 
transmission are sketched and organizational spatial structure 
data for seven metropolitan complexes of the western United 
States are presented. These data, and the suImarized findinqs 
of other recent research projects, consistently point to the 
inaccuracy of the growth-transmission assu-nptions held by many 
regional planners and academics in advanced econonies. 
Consequently, certain realities that need to be considered in 
regional development policy formulation are enumerated. 

I. INTRODUCTION 
It is often observed that "on the whole most countries have 
fallen short of their iregional policy) objectives, even when the 
policies have been pursued over decades" (Emanuel, 1974). This 
is true for post-industrial and highly industrialized countries 
and for less advanced economies. In particular, growth-center 
and growth-pole strategies designed either to stimulate regional 
development in lagging and depressed regions, or to hinder the 
expansion of major metropolitan complexes at best have met with 
limited success given the scale of efforts made. The dismal 
performance of the growth-center policy implemented by the 
Economic Development Administration in the United States is well 
known (e.g., Hansen, 1973). Similarly, the achievement record 
of growth-center and related policies in Australia, Canada, 
France, Great Britain, Japan, and in other advanced economies is 
far from impressive (e.g., Penouill, 1969; Kabaya, 1971; Walker, 
1975). 
In any advanced economy there are numerous and often complex 
reasons for the failure or modest attainments of growth-center 
and growth-pole policies. However, the evidence put forth in 
this report would seem to indicate that, in the great majority 
of instances, a substantial portion of the blame can be traced 
ta grzssly mistaken assumptions concerning the channels of 
interurban growth transmission that occur in economically advanced 
systems of cities. Thus, a brief critical look at these assump- 
tions is necessary before examining the city-system interdepen- 
dencies created by private-sector multilocational organizations 
headquartered in selected metropolitan complexes of the western 
United States, and before summarizing some related interurban 
growth-transmission findings recently presented by other 
researchers. 
11. GROWTH-TRANSMISSION ASSUIQTIONS OF REGIONAL PLA'TNING 
Most of the implicit and explicit assumptions made by prac- 
ticing regional planners, academic consultants, and interested 
scholars regarding the spatial transmission of growth or the 
flow of multiplier effects and employment creation within systems 
of cities fall into two interrelated categories. First, there 
are those who contend that any significant investment or expan- 
sion of economic activity at a growth center or at a spatially 
defined growth pole will lead to a concentration of spread 
effects within the tarqet center itself and its trading hinter- 
land or zone of influence (e.g., Boudeville, 1966). More 
explicitly, most of those adhering to this Perroux-influenced 
school of thought assume that propulsive manufacturing activities, 
or lead firms. will always generate sizable employment-growth 
impacts in close proximity to the location of their operations 
as a consequence of the creation of backward and forward linkages 
and employee income expenditures (Hermansen, 1972; Erickson, 
1972, 1974, 1975). Put somewhat differently, this group of 
planners and academics implicitly or explicitly assume that the 
interurban transmission of growth within economically advanced 
city-systems is largely or totally confined to the flow of 
multiplier effects from cities of a given size to less populous 
nearby centers. The possibility that sizable nonlocal multiplier 
leakages occur to more distant urban places of larger, comgarable, 
or smaller size is usually ignored. 
The second category of commonly occurring growth-transmission 
assumptions is phrased in hierarchical diffusion terms derived 
from Christallerian central-place theory. According to Berry 
(1972, 1973), Lasuhn (1971, 1973), and others, economic growth 
spreads on an interurban basis as a result of the filtering, or 
trickling down, of innovations downward through the urban hierar- 
chy. In other words, economic innovations supposedly are ini- 
tlally adopted without exception in the largest metropolitan 
complex of a national or regional system of cities, and their 
subsequent paths of diffusion are determined by the size order 
of cities. Likewise, once economic innovations are intentionally 
introduced in a regional growth center they, or their growth 
impulses, presumably sooner or later will descend downward 
through the regional urban hierarchy, with the population rank 
of hinterland centers dictating the locational sequence of 
adoptions or felt growth impulses. The possibility of interurban 
growth transmission occurring from a city of given size to places 
of comparable or larger size is therefore also denied--at least 
implicitly--by diffusion proponents of growth-center planning. 
Both the propulsive industry, or hinterland, and the dif- 
fusion views of interurban growth transmission are characterized 
by numerous shortcomings. Insofar as the propulsive industry 
version of growth transmission is inseparable from applied 
growth-pole theory, it is subject to the wide range of criticisms 
directed toward that so-called theory (e-g., Darwent, 1969; 
Jansen, 1970; Kongstad, 1974; Monstad, 1974; Pred, 1973a, 1974a; 
and Todd, 1973). To argue that growth transmission is mostly or 
fully restricted to the hinterland of a growth center is to 
maintain that regional or subregional city-systems have a very 
high degree of closure, i.e., a low degree of interaction and 
interdependence with urban units situated elsewhere in the 
national city-system. This position refutes the fact that the 
national system of cities of any advanced economy is a type of 
complex social system which, by definition, is distinguished 
by the extremely intricate interdependence of its component 
units (cf. Bourne, 1974). It also ignores the great likelihood 
that a large propulsive industrial unit will belong to a multi- 
locational organization with a variety of extra-regional intra- 
organizational and interorganizational linkages (Krumme, 1970a, 
1970b; Pred, 1974b, 1975~). Thus, Erickson has observed (1972, 
P. 431): 
The foremost problem encountered in economic growth 
based on backward directed (linkage) impulse (s) is 
the openness of most regional economies. Such open- 
ness would suggest that backward-directed pressures 
of demand by a lead firm may (not be met in a growth 
center or its hinterland but instead) result in 
imports of necessary intermediate goods (or services) 
into the region. 
The unrealistic nature of the assumption that a growth 
center and its zone of influence constitute a more or less closed 
system is perhaps best illustrated by the detailed input-output 
analyses carried out for large metropolitan complexes such as 
Philadelphia (Isard and Langford, 1971), Seattle-Tacoma (Beyers, 
19741, and Stockholm (Artle, 1965). These analyses have consis- 
tently demonstrated that many of the most important goods and 
service linkages, or growth-transmission channels, of any given 
sector occur with nonlocal units. For example, despite its 
highly diversified economy, the Philadelphia metropolitan complex 
secures nearly 50 percent of its consumed goods and services 
from other locations. Likewise, despite greatly varied local 
demands, the Philadelphia metropolitan complex exports roughly 
50 percent of its goods and service output. Even more signifi- 
cantly, the backward and forward linkages of Seattle-Tacoma's 
economic sectors on the whole are strongest with regions beyond 
the borders of the state of Washington, i.e. with regions lying 
outside the hinterland of that metropolitan complex. From 
findings such as these it may be concluded that the extra-regional 
interdependence of the smaller and less economically diverse 
cities typically selected as growth centers is normally consid- 
erable. Further support for this conclusion is provided by the 
organizational spatial structure data to be presented on later 
pages. 
Hierarchical diffusion interpretations of interurban growth 
transmission rest on rather shaky empirical underpinnings. The 
small number of empirical studies attempting to link diffusion 
with the spatial spread of economic growth have centered mostly 
on innovations that are artifacts of growth, such as TV-ownership, 
rather than on growth-inducing innovations, such as new products 
and services, new production and communications technology, and 
new ways of performing or structuring the operations of business 
and government organizations. More importantly, it has been 
demonstrated at length (Pred, 1971, 1973a, 1974a, 1973b, 1975a) 
that inasmuch as hierarchical growth diffusion assumptions rest 
on Christallerian central-place theory, they are not defendable 
from either a logical or an empirical standpoint. Given its 
length and ready availability elsewhere, reasoning of how hierar- 
chical growth-transmission arguments ignore the complexity of 
those intermetropolitan, economic and information-circulation 
relationships that channel the diffusion of growth-inducing 
innovations is not repeated here. However, it must be emphasized 
that while central-place theory is frequently invoked by regional 
planners, this theory is largely inappropriate as a basis for 
interurban growth-transmission assumptions. This is so because 
central-place theory is basically concerned with optimizing the 
convergence of consumers at points of supply, or with market- 
area and city-hinterland relationships, while the interurban 
transmission of growth in economically advanced economies is 
largely the consequence of both input-output relationships and 
intraorganizational job-control and decision-making relation- 
ships. Finally, to the extent that a central-place hierarchical 
perspective on growth transmission is wedded to a growth-pole 
ntheory" approach to the question (e.g., Hermansen, 1972), it 
is also susceptible to many of the broadsides aimed at that 
latter school of thought. 
111. INTERURBAN GROWTH TRANSMISSIOIJ AND TEE SPATIAL STRUCTUPX 
OF ORGMIZATIOIJS 
There are considerable obstacles to the empirical delineation 
of interurban growth transmission at a large scale. In 
advanced economies there is generally a paucity of data per- 
taining to the physical expression of interurban multiplier 
effects, or of data relating to the movement of goods, services, 
and monetary payments. Even where available, such data are 
usually inadequate in some aspect, such as precision or locational 
detail (Thompson, 1974). Input-output analysis, another theo- 
retically possible means of specifying city-system interdepen- 
dencies and growth-transmission channels, is highly impractical 
in reality. Input-output studies of the variety carried out for 
the Philadelphia, Seattle-Tacoma, and Stockholm metropolitan 
complexes are expensive and extremely time-consuming. Further- 
more, such studies provide little locational information, only 
describing the relationships of an urban complex with "the rest 
of the world" or, at best, "the rest of the staten. Thus, in 
order to secure details sufficient enough to outline growth 
transmission channels at a large scale (i-e., to specify sectoral 
input-output relationships between several urban regions of a 
national city-system) it would be necessary to undertake a 
project of unprecedented dimensions. And, even if it were fea- 
sible to carry out such a large-scale project, its results and 
utility would still be open to the criticisms (e.g. changing 
input and production coefficients) often directed toward much 
more modest input-output analyses (e.g., Richardson, 1973). 
With flow-data and input-output options closed, probably 
the best means of gaining insight into the economic interdepen- 
dencies and channels of growth transmission operating within 
the city-system of any advanced economy is by examining the 
spatial structure of multilocational organizations. The primary 
justification for doing this lies in the fact that the economy 
of countries such as Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States is dominated 
by large private-sector corporations and government organizations 
that are multilocational in character, i.e., comprised of a 
number of spatially separated and functionally differentiated 
units. A plentitude of revenue, asset, and employment data show 
that the relative and absolute economic might of multilocational 
organizations has burgeoned since the Second World War (e.g., 
~hnstrom, 1973; Pred, 1974b; and Rogerson, 1974). Multilocational 
governmental organizations have grown in size owing to the 
assumption of new and expanded functions. Multilocational private- 
sector organizations have swelled in size owing to intense 
merger and acquisition activities, the expansion of existing 
units, and the investment of capital in completely new units 
(e.g., Blair, 1972). For example, in 1974, 150 business enter- 
prises answered for 88 percent of Sweden's total exports and, 
partly as a result of foreign operations, the country's 200 
largest domestically headquartered business organizations had 
aggregate revenues that exceeded the gross national product (GNP) 
(Veckans Affarer, 1975). In short, insofar as multilocational 
organizations control the lion's share of any advanced economy, 
they are overwhelmingly the most important propagators of flows 
of goods, services, economic information, and capital; hence, 
the predominant source of interdependencies within the national 
city-system, and hence the most important generators of inter- 
urban growth transmission. 
When the spatial structure of a multilocational organization 
can be specified, i.e., when the location, function(s), and 
relative size of its headquarters and other component units can 
be determined, it is possible both to make some fairly firm 
observations on the interurban growth-transmission channels 
created by intraorganizational relationships and to hazard some 
guesses concerning the interorganizationally generated flow of 
multiplier effects from city to city. Likewise, when data on 
the spatial structure of all significant locally headquartered 
multilocational organizations are aggregated for a city or for 
a large urban complex, it is possible to make some gross general- 
izations about the total pattern of intraorganizationally and 
interorganizationallly propagated growth-transmission channels 
associated with that particular city or urban complex. 
Although the headquarters units of multilocational firms 
and corporations grant varying degrees of discretionary authority 
to their subservient regional or divisional administrative units, 
marketing offices, sales outlets, plants, or research centers, 
etc., (Pred, 1975~) they almost always retain certain minimal 
functions in order to cope with the diversity and instability of 
the economic, technological, and political environment. These 
include determining and coordinating strategic objectives, 
planning on a long term, resolving interunit or interdivisional 
conflicts, granting approval of projects involving major com- 
mitments of capital and manpower, and allocating funds and 
resources among competing operating divisions or subunits 
(Williamson, 1970; Lorsch and Allen, 1973). Whether or not the 
head office of a multilocational organization takes much respon- 
sibility for routine operational activities, there are virtually 
always important decision-making, information-flow, and service- 
provision linkages connecting an organization's headquarters and 
its subservient units--be they spatially proximate or distant 
(cf. Britton, 1974; Krunrme, 1970; and Krumme and Hayter, 1975) . 
Moreover, "as organizations grow, so does the need for internal 
co-ordination" (Goddard and Morris, 1974, p. 109). Therefore, 
any sizable employment or activity increase at an organizational 
subunit should result in some employment or activity increase at 
organizational headquarters, or in the transmission of growth 
from the subunit city to the headquarter's metropolitan complex. 
Some, but by no means all, of the interorganizationally 
based transmission of growth impacts from urban complex to urban 
complex can be surmised from organizational spatial structure 
data because of the limited-search and uncertainty-reduction 
syndromes of organizational decision-making behavior. These 
syndromes normally come into play whenever organizations make 
implicit locational decisions of the type that definitionally 
engender the flow of goods, services, information, and multi- 
plier effects from place to place. (Every purchase of goods and 
services, every award of a contract or subcontract, and every 
allocation of capital is an implicit location decision insofar 
as it involves one or more places rather than others.) In spite 
of the obviously important ramifications of most implicit 
(and explicit) locational decision making, it has been repeatedly 
shown that multilocational organizations typically examine only 
a few decision options when considering new forms of action 
(e.g., Cyert and March, 1963; North, 1973). The limited search 
syndrome normally is ascribed to a number of factors; the most 
crucial is the time and cost expenses that would be incurred if 
highly'salaried management and administrative personnel per- 
formed extensive search for each of the many'decisions that multi- 
locational organizations constantly must reach on such issues as 
labor relations, pricing, and public relations, as well as 
implicitly locational matters. Regardless of the factors under- 
lying limited search, it frequently should result in the iden- 
tification of familiar locational alternatives. This is so 
because limited search usuallv uncovers the most easily 
accessible information, and this information should originate 
from or near the location of the organization's already 
existing intraorganizational and external contacts. In 
sum, to the extent this is true, organizational spatial structure 
statistics can shed some light--however dim--on the interurban 
transmission of growth associated with interorganizational 
relationships. 
The tendency for multilocational organizations to make 
implicit locational decisions that are influenced by their 
existing spatial structure (as well as by their existing inter- 
organizational contacts) is reinforced by the commonplace desire 
of organizational decision makers to reduce uncertainty and 
avoid risk. In particular, large corporations are known to seek 
uncertainty reduction frequently by choosing alternatives that 
are viewed as similar to those opted for in the recent past by 
the corporation itself or by other organizations of which it is 
aware. The temptation to repeat the selection of alternatives 
previously chosen by the corporation itself may be further 
compounded by the possibility of obtaining scale economies, or 
lower per-unit purchase costs. 
In a similar manner, the limited search and uncertainty 
reduction syndromes also affect the explicit locational decision- 
making behavior of multilocational organizations. The somewhat 
more precise means by which explicit locational decision making, 
or the selection of locations for completely new organizational 
units, is affected by existing interurban information and growth- 
transmission channels, (which in turn, inflwnces such intraorga- 
nizational and interorganizational channels in later time periods) 
has been explained in a model presented elsewhere in a number 
of versions (Pred, 1973a, 1974b, 1975a, 1975b, 1975~). The 
model and its associated arguments are not repeated here in part 
because they are not essential to an appreciation of the 
empirical materials that follow. 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM SELECTED METROPOL-ITAN COMPLEXES 
OF THE WESTERN, UNITED STATES 
During the latter part of 1974 and the early months of 1975 
an effort was made to ascertain the spatial structure of all the 
private-sector multilocational organizations employing 400 or 
more people that were then locally headquartered in eight metro- 
politan complexes of the western United States, as well as in 
Vancouver, Canada. A simple three-step procedure was used to 
elicit the virtually complete data for the seven metropolitan 
complexes covered in Tables 1 to 5 and Figures 1 to 9. First, a 
questionnaire was mailed out to the organizations requesting 
them to indicate the location of each of their US and Canadian 
units or any of their wholly-owned subsidiaries; the primary 
function(s1 of each unit; and the number of people employed at 
each unit. Second, those organizations that either failed to 
respond or to provide adequate data were contacted by telephone. 
Finally, personal visits were paid to those firms and corporations 
that either exhibited reluctance or had supplied totally unusable 
data. Because of the well-known difficulty of obtaining financial 
statistics from business organizations, and because of a desire 
to obtain as complete a picture of city-system interdependencies 
as possible, the data requested concerned employment rather than 
revenues, assets, or purchase origins and sales destinations. 
Organizational job-control, or employment data were also sought 
since the research was undertaken with, among other things, a 
number of regional-planning policy questions in mind; moreover, 
the ultimate objective of so much regional planning in advanced 
economies is the creation and maintenance of new job opportunities. 
When the data summarized in Tables 1 to 5 and Figures 1 to 9 
are jointly considered, at least four generalizations emerge that 
are central to the question of interurban growth transmission 
within advanced economies. 
Generalization 1. Despite the considerable distances 
separating the selected metropolitan complexes from the major 
part of the US-Canadian system of cities, the aggregate strength 
of nonlocal intraorganizational linkages created by their multi- 
locational business organizations is considerable(Tab1e 1). (In 
view of the limited search and uncertainty reduction arguments 
outlined above, this should also be true of the nonlocal inter- 
organizational linkages fostered by the multilocational firms 
and corporations in question.) Given the populations of the 
seven metropolitan complexes as of 1970,l only the San Diego 
SMSA has a less than impressive number of jobs controlled non- 
locally (and locally) by rnultilocational private-sector organi- 
zations headquartered within its limits. In all seven cases 
the total volume of nonlocal intraorganizational linkages 
suggested by Tables 1 to 4 is considerably understated, in part 
owing to the exclusion of linkages involving partly-owned 
subsidiaries, and the omission of linkages involving joint 
ventures. For example, the 4,400 San X e g o  employees of 
National steel and Shipbuilding have not been taken into account 
because the company is owned 50 percent by Kaiser Industries 
(based in Oakland) and 50 percent by Morrison-Knudsen Co. Inc. 
(based in Boise City). Were the company included, the nonlocal 
job-control totals of the San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose metro- 
politan complex and the Boise City SMSA would each be enhanced 
by 2,200. The aggregate volume of nonlocal intraorganizational 
linkages would be further enlarged if some account was taken of 
the job control of local divisional or subsidiary head offices 
belonging to corporations with elsewhere located organization- 
wide headquarters. (Job-control figures for the San Francisco- 
Oakland-San Jose metropolitan complex, for example, do not 
include the almost 100,000 employees of Pacific Telephone, 
despite the presence of its head administrative unit in San 
Francisco. Pacific Telephone is a subsidiary of the New York- 
based American Telephone 6 Telegraph Co.) 
The.San Diego exception with respect to nonlocal intra- 
organizational job control arises in some measure because of 
the leading part played in its economy by the federal government, 
especially the military establishment. That is, a very sub- 
stantial portion of the linkages originating and terminating 
in the San Diego metropolitan complex are associated with public- 
sector multilocational organizations rather than with private- 
sector multilocational organizations. Moreover, as with the 
other selected metropolitan complexes, a large share of the 
local San Diego job-market and economy is directly tied into 
multilocational business organizations based in other metropoli- 
tan centers such as St. Louis, General Dynamics Corporation; 
Detroit, Burroughs Corporation; and San Francisco-Oakland-San 
Jose, Saf eway Stores and Bank of America (see Table 4) . 
  he 1 970 populations of the San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose , 
Seattle-Tacoma, Portland, Phoenix, Honolulu, and San Diego metro- 
politan complexes are given in Table 4. In 1970 the Boise City 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area had a population of 112,230. 
2F'or 1972 data on the control of Phoenix SMSA manufacturing 
jobs by elsewhere headquartered multilocational business organi- 
zations, see Pred (1975~). For 1965 data on the nonlocal control 
of manufacturfng jobs in the San-Francisco-Oakland-San Jose and 
Portland metropolitan complexes, see Pred (1974b, 1975a). 
The San Diego case is counterpointed by the situation pre- 
vailing in the Boise City SMSA where, on a per capita basis, the 
level of nonlocal job control approaches that for the New York 
City metropolitan complex, which in turn accounts for roughly 
33 percent of the job control ssociated with all US multiloca- 
tional business organizations. Boise ' s very high relative level 
of nonlocal intraorganizational linkages is mainly the product 
of four organizations: the Boise Cascade Corporation (forest- 
products conglomerate with 29,000 domestic and foreign employees); 
Morrison-Knudsen Co. Inc. (diversified heavy construction and 
engineering firm with 21,000 employees, mostly overseas); 
Albertsons Inc. (retailing concern with over $1 billion in sales 
during 1974, and about 14,000 employees), and J.R. Simplot 
Company (food processing and fertilizer mining and production, 
about 6,000 employees) . 
Generalization 2. Despite the exclusion of relationships 
involving partly-owned subsidiaries, joint ventures, and divi- 
sional or subsidiary head offices, the overall pattern of inter- 
urban growth transmission stemming from the spatial structure 
of multilocational organizations is complex in several senses. 
The spatial distribution of intraorganizational job-control 
linkages for most metropolitan cornpiexes exhibits either limited 
distance decay, as in the San Francisco-Oakland-San Joe, Seattle- 
Tacoma, Portland, Boise City, and San Diego cases (Figures 1 to 4, 
6, 7, and 91, or virtually no distance decay, as in the Phoenix 
SMSA example (Figure 5) The distance decay of Honolulu's 
intraorganizational job-control linkages (Figure 8) is not an 
unanticipated exception, given both the extreme physical and 
time-zone distance separating that island metropolis from the 
eastern US and Canada, and the relatively recent and cautious 
entry Of its major conglomerates (AMFAC, Castle & Cooke, 
Dillingham Corp.) into the operation of mainland retailing, 
production, and engineering units. 
The complexity of the intermetropolitan pattern of intra- 
organizationally induced growth transmission is also ascribable 
to the number of these linkages radiating from individual centers. 
Multilocational business organizations based in the San Francisco- 
Oakland-San Jose complex, for example, control units in 234 
other US and Canadian metropolitan centers. And, multilocational 
business organizations headquartered in Seattle-Tacoma operate 
offices, plants, and establishments in 144 other US-Canadian 
metropolitan complexes; the multilocational corporations based 
in the much less populous Boise City SMSA function in no fewer 
than 108 other metropolitan complexes scattered across the entire 
US-Canadian economic landscape. 
3~ased on computations using employment data from Dun and 
Bradstreet Inc. (1 974) . 
4 ~ o r  figures showing the spatial distribution of Seattle- 
Tacoma job-control linkages, see Pred (1975~). 
Many linkage-pattern details are additionally complex in 
the sense that they are unexpected from a gravity-model per- 
spective; this may be seen from the following examples: 
a) the most important job-control linkages of the 
Phoenix SMSA are with the Chicago metropolitan 
complex, rather than with the comparably sized 
but physically much more proximate Los Angeles 
metropolitan complex (Figure 5) ; 
b) the intraorganizationally generated interdepen- 
dencies between San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose 
and the eastern Tennessee centers of Knoxville 
and Kingsport-Bristol are of greater importance 
than those with such metropolitan complexes as 
Detroit, Cincinnati, and Indianapolis, which 
lie at similar distances from northern California 
but have much larger populations (Figure 1 ) ;  and 
C) the leading job-control linkages of Seattle- 
Tacoma are with the Wichita SMSA and Philadelphia 
metropolitan complex rather than with larger and 
more locationally accessible metropolitan centers 
(Table 4). 
The job-control distribution peculiarities and eccentricities 
of specific metropolitan complexes often lose much of their 
mystery once one is familiar with the nature of the corporations 
that dominate the local headquarters scene. Phoenix's pattern 
of intraorganizational linkages with other metropolitan complexes 
(Figure 5) becomes somewhat clearer because the Arizona center 
houses the headquarters of the Greyhound Corporation (bus trans- 
portation and manufacturing conglomerate with about 55,000 
employees). Likewise, the Seattle-Tacoma pattern of intraorgani- 
zational growth-transmission ties with other metropolitan com- 
plexes is greatly influenced by the Boeing Company (aircraft 
production and aerospace activities with about 68,000 employees). 
Also the Portland pattern of job-control linkages with nonhinter- 
land smaller cities and towns (Figure 4) is highly affected by 
three corporations with a total of over 67,000 employees (Georgia 
Pacific, Louisiana Pacific, and Evans Products), and by several 
smaller organizations that are primarily associated with forest 
products activities. In the context of previously mentioned 
limited-search and uncertainty-reduction observations, whenever 
a metropolitan complex has a major corporation, such as Boeing, 
operating on a large scale in an "unexpected" metropolitan 
center, such as Wichita, normally it also has several other multi- 
locational organizations controlling units in the same center. 
Generalization 3. Whatever the irregularities shaped by 
very large multilocational organizations, the total array of non- 
local intraorganizational growth-transmission linkages of business 
organizations based in any particular metropolitan complex is 
highlighted by ties with other metropolitan complexes. That is, 
the most important nonlocal intraorganizational (and, by extension, 
interorganizational growth-transmission channels of any single 
metropolitan ccomplex do not extend between that urban unit and 
smaller places situated within its traditionally defined retail- 
trade, or central place, hinterland. In fact, for the seven 
centers covered here, the percentage of nonlocal intraorganiza- 
tional linkages involving other metropolitan complexes ranges 
from 45.1 to 79.3, while the percentage of intraorganizational 
interdependencies involving hinterland locations is clustered 
between 2.9 and 21.2, with the exception of Honolulu (Table 2 ) .  
More significantly, again with the exception of Honolulu, the 
ratio of nonhinterland metropolitan linkages to all hinterland 
lin ages varies from a 'low of 2.3:l to a high of 25.4:l (Table 
5) .' Incomplete data indicate that generalization 3 is also 
true for the intraorganizational growth-transmission linkages 
generated by multilocational corporations and firms headquartered 
in the Los Angeles metropolitan complex. 
Generalization 4. In every instance nonhinterland smaller 
towns and cities constitute an important element in the overall 
pattern of interurban growth-transmission channels of intraorgani- 
zational origin (Table 2 and Figures 2, 4, and 7). For five of 
the seven metropolitan complexes under discussion, the absolute 
number of jobs controlled by locally based multilocational organi- 
zations is greater for nonhinterland smaller towns and cities 
than it is for the hinterland as a whole. This is also true for 
the San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose metropolitan complex if its 
hin erland is circumscribed in a less than liberal manner (Table 
2) .' As a consequence of the magnitude of job-control interde- 
pendencies involving nonhinterland smaller towns and cities, the 
ratio of all nonhinterland linkages to all hinterland linkages 
is 3.7: 1 or greater (Table 5) . 
As indicated earlier, it is not possible to exactly specify 
the means by which the intraorganizational transmission of growth 
between cities is related to the interorganizational transmission 
of growth between cities. Nevertheless, the above generalizations-- 
and especially generalizations 3 and 4--would seem to indicate 
that the assumptions normally made by regional planners concerning 
the spatial transmission of growth are both grossly incorrect 
and overly simple. If the data presented here are at all repre- 
sentative of the interdependencies to be found in economically 
advanced systems of cities, and if the ratio of all nonhinter- 
land linkages to all hinterland linkages elsewhere is also 
 he unusually great relative importance of the Honolulu 
SMSA's hinterland linkages is once more relatable to the tradi- 
tional plantation-agriculture functions of its leading corporations 
and the metropolitan center's time-zone and physical distances 
from the continental US. 
6 ~ h e  failure of the statement to hold true for the 
Honolulu SMSA is understandable: see footnote 5 .  
of nonhinterland linkages in general, but also more precisely 
indicate that nonlocal multiplier-effect leakages can frequently 
involve head-office metropolitan complexes situated at consid- 
erable distances of a thousand miles or more. 
The incompatibility of Christallerian central-place theory, 
or hierarchical diffusion growth-transmission assumptions with 
the above presented empirical materials can be summarized in a 
number of ways. 
First, we can give the hierarchical diffusion assumption an 
extremely free interpretation, allowing it to mean that growth 
can be directly transmitted from a.center of given size to any 
other urban place occurring within its hinterland, or to any less 
populous metropolitan complex outside its hinterland--regardless 
of the distance involved and of the existence of intervening 
larger metropolitan complexes. Even under these relaxed circum- 
stances, 41.8 to 80.1 percent of the job-control, or growth- 
transmission, linkages for the here observed metropolitan com- 
plexes go unaccounted for (Table 5, column I). 
Secondly, we give the hierarchical diffusion assumption a 
strictly literal interpretation, disallowing the possibility that 
growth can be transmitted to any metropolitan complex located 
beyond the borders of a specific center's physically contiguous 
retail-trade hinterland. Now the spectrum of linkages unaccounted 
for is shifted upward considerably, spreading from 56.8 to 97.1 
percent (Table 5, column 11) . 
Thirdly, because of their importance, we focuse solely on 
intermetropolitan linkages, allowing the hierarchical assumption 
to mean that growth can be transmitted from a metropolitan center 
of a given size to any other metropolitan complex that is not of 
comparable or larger population--regardless of whether it occurs 
within the center's hinterland. Under these comparatively loose 
constraints, between 33.7 and 100.0 percent of the intermetro- 
politan job-control linkages associated with the seven studied 
metropolitan complexes cannot be accounted for (Table 5, column 
111) . 
7 ~ h e  direct transmission of growth to nonhinterland smaller 
towns and cities is not permitted here because it is presumed, 
in accord with Christaller-based diffusion hypotheses, that such 
urban places can only receive direct growth impulses from those 
metropolitan complexes within whose sphere of influence they are 
located. 
Finally, a strictly literal interpretation of hierarchical 
diffusion is applied, requiring intermetropolitan growth trans- 
mission to be confined to hinterland metropolitan complexes. 
The percentage of unexplained intermetropolitan linkages now 
reaches impressively high levels that fall between 80.4 and 100.0 
percent (Table 5, column IV) . 
If we consider the magnitude of observed deviations under 
any of these four alternatives, it seems safe to suggest that 
only under unusual conditions can there be a firm foundation for 
the assumption that growth is transmitted solely via hierarchical 
diffusion from cities of a given size to less populous nearby 
centers. 
V. OTHER RECENT FINDINGS ON INTERURBAN GROWTH TRAElSMISSIOM 
Recently, several researchers posing questions samewhat dif- 
ferent from those raised here have produced a variety of evidence 
that also points to the inaccuracy of the interurban growth- 
transmission assumptions generally made by planners and academics 
in advanced economies. Only some of the most cogent of these 
findings are summarized below. 
Finding 1. Based on data acquired "from a sample of manu- 
facUuring establishments located within 40 miles of downtown 
Montreal," Gilmour, (197b) found that the most important input- 
output linkages, or growth-transmission channels, occurred outside 
the local metropolitan complex. In particular, only 27.3 percent 
of all sales and 31.6 percent of all purchases resulted in 
intrametropolitan linkages. More notably, large establishments 
with 100 or more employees aggregately made "over half of all 
their transactions" outside of the Province of Quebec, or well 
outside the hinterland of the Montreal metropolitan complex. 
It is also relevant that Gilmour was able to attribute some of 
the "spatial expansiveness" of Montreal's manufacturing linkages 
to the economies obtained from interacting with distant units 
belonging to the same corporation or firm. 
Pindinqf2. Britton's service-linkage study (1974) of 87 
Ontario manu acturing plants reveals that key auditing, legal, 
and financial services are usually procured from Toronto and 
more distant non-Ontario metropolitan complexes if, as in most 
instances, the observed factory is part of a multilocational 
organization. The services obtained from Toronto or from more 
distant metropolitan locations apparently involve economies of 
scale which are either provided intraorganizationally, i.e., by 
divisional or organization-wide headquarters, or interorganiza- 
tionally, i.e., by service firms serving a head office and many 
or all of its dependent units. In either case, such nonlocal 
service acquisition is synonymous with multiplier-effect leakages, 
or growth transmission, upward rather than downward through the 
urban hierarchy. Growth is transmitted to nonhinterland locations 
when service multipliers leak to Toronto and to other large North 
American metropolitan complexes either from the London or 
St. Catherines-Niagara Falls metropolitan areas or from lesser 
Ontario urban places. 
Finding 3. A detailed analysis of the input linkages and 
income generated by the Boeing Company of Seattle-Tacoma has led 
Erickson (1975) to conclude that the hinterland spread (or growth- 
transmission) effects of "propulsive" manufacturing activities 
"may be more illusory than real". While some local impact of 
the wage and salary expenditures of Boeing employees was dis- 
covered, the total impact of Boeing's interorganizational pur- 
chases on hinterland economic activities was comparatively small. 
As of 1967, nearly 90 percent of Boeing's purchases originated 
from beyond the Seattle-Tacoma hinterland, and "the firm's inter- 
industry linkages generated income in the hinterland equal to 
only 0.003 percent of total hinterland value added". Furthermore, 
the most important metropolitan suppliers to Boeing's Seattle- 
Tacoma activities fell into three categories, none of which is 
in keeping with hierarchical diffusion interpretations of inter- 
urban growth transmission. The major input pwviders were located 
in the smaller but distant nonhinterland metropolitan complexes 
of Hartford (Conn. and Rockford (Ill.), in the larger metropoli- 
tan complexes of Los Angeles, New York, Detroit, and Cleveland- 
Akron, and in the San Diego, Phoenix, and Dallas-Fort Worth 
metropolitan complexes--all of which belong to the same general 
population size category as Seattle-Tacoma . 
=iw . Moseley's investigations (1 973a, 1973b) into the growt -transmission impacts of growth centers in East Anglia 
and Brittany have led him to observe that "severe doubts must be 
cast on the notion that 'growth impulses' ... trickle down" to 
smaller places. With respect to Haverhill and Thetford, two East 
Anglian growth centers, it could be stated that expansion "has 
improved the choice of employment and presumably the prosperity 
of many residents of the small towns and villages surrounding 
them, but in terms of the generation of supplementary economic 
activity, such impulses appear to have 'trickled up'". For 
example, in 1971 roughly 93 percent of the material inputs of the 
large Haverhill and Thetford factories came from beyond East 
Anglia and Essex. Furthermore, most of the intraregional growth 
transmission resulting from industrial purchases terminated at 
larger urban units, particularly Cambridge and Nowich. With 
respect to Rennes, the leading metropolitan center of Brittany, 
trend surface analyses showed that the transmission of growth to 
hinterland locations was probably largely confined to places 
within a commuting radius of a mere 20 to 25 kilometers. 
Finding 5. Research involving the Central Clydeside Con- 
urbation, or Glasgow metropolitan complex, and other parts of 
Scotland further confirms the leakage of multiplier effects to 
'See footnote h in Table 5 on' the size-category assignment 
of the Phoenix SMSA. 
nonhinterland metropolitan complexes (Eirn, 1974; Lever, 1974). 
Approximately 80 percent of the 1970-71 purchases made by 24 
glass, electrical machinery, paper, tool, paint, and clothing 
factories involved centers outside of Scotland, i..e., nonhinter- 
land locations (Lever, 1974). Here too, the nonhinterland 
transmission of growth is intimately related to the spatial 
structure of organizations. Most of Scotland's manufacturing 
capacity belongs to multilocational organizations whose primary 
administrative and headquarters functions are carried out in 
London, elsewhere in the United Kingdom, or overseas. Non- 
Scottish headquarters units frequently make decisions concerning 
the procurement of materials, semi-finished goods, and services. 
"Economies of scale in transport and information collectionn 
give these head-office units "an advantage in identifying and 
using more distant (non-Scottish) suppliersn (Lever, 1974). 
=w . Similarly, a number of other British studies (e.g., Mose ey and Townroe, 1913; Salt, 1967) indicate that the 
input linkages of branch plants associated with elsewhere based 
multilocational corporations typically "extend over wide geo- 
graphical areasn. At the same time the local and hinterland 
component of suppliers is virtually always unimportant. 
v . Several Swedish studies provide additional vivid 11 ustrations of both nonhinterland and nonhierarchical 
interurban growth transmission (e.g., Bylund and Ek, 1974; 
Erson, 1974; Fredriksson, Riksson and Lindmark, 1974; and Herlitz, 
1974). For example, over 52 percent of the physical inputs 
acquired nonlocally in 1970 by manufacturing units located in 
Malmo--a metropolitan complex with a population around 450,000-- 
were found to originate in nonhinterland metropolitan centers, 
cities, and towns belonging to smaller population categories. 
Yet another 27 percent of such purchases were made from the 
larger nonhinterland complexes of Stockholm (population about 
1.45 million) and from Gothenburg (population about 725,000). 
The corresponding figures for nonlocally secured business services 
are equally impressive: over 47 percent from smaller nonhinter- 
land urban places, and over 44 percent from the more populous 
Stockholm and Gothenburg. Comparable evidence based on 1970 
input and output flows exists for  ora as, ~kelleftea, and Borlange- 
Falun, "metropolitan areas" with populations ranging from 81,000 
to 190,000.9 
=%v . An examination of wholesaling, correspondent banking an other statistics has allowed Borchert (1972) to 
contend that "the major US metropolitan centers are less important 
as regional capitals, (i.e., as hinterland-oriented complexes) 
than they are as major components in the national system of 
labor, entrepreneurship, and capital". 
en or additional data with English commentary see Pred (1975~1. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the context of the new and reviewed materials on inter- 
urban growth transmission presented here, it should come as no 
surprise that growth-center and spatial growth-pole policies in 
advanced economies have constantly fallen short of expectations. 
Yet, when repeated in the literature with frequency by well-known 
authorities, academic and planning-theory myths tend to become 
accepted as verities and therefore die slowly. Thus, both the 
"propulsiven industry, or hinterland-contained, and the hierar- 
chical diffusion assumptions of interurban growth transmission 
continue to enjoy widespread currency among Western European and 
North American planners; at the same time empirical evidence 
consistently emphasizes the overriding significance of nonhinter- 
land and nonhierarchical input-output linkages and employment- 
multiplier channels. Thus planners and policy-makers in advanced 
economies should take certain realities into consideration if 
their future regional development schemes are to generate employ- 
ment at desired locations. These realities are at least three 
in number; their nature is such that they should be deliberated 
regardless of any factors other than mistaken growth-transmission 
assumptions that may underlie the disappointing performance of 
specific growth-center or growth-pole policies of the past. 
First, and most essentially, it must be acknowledged that 
no regional planning policy is likely to be either goal consis- 
tent or as successful as anticipated unless its formulation is 
preceded by studies establishing the peculiar underlying struc- 
ture of growth-transmission interdependencies within the con- 
cerned regional and national system of cities. Unless mistaken 
assumptions are cast aside and major existing channels of inter- 
urban growth transmission are identified, investments and resource 
allocations made by private- and public-sector organizations at 
specific places are apt to lead to income and employment multi- 
pliers at other unanticipated places--perhaps even at places 
where the desired objective is dampened growth. The achievement 
of some basic comprehension of the predominant linkages of inter- 
urban growth transmission is especially crucial because of the 
known long-term stability of such linkages (e.g., Pred, 1973a, 
197333; Simmons, 1974b). At the very least regional planners can 
gain some crude insight into the pertinent major channels of 
growth transmission by undertaking a survey of intraorganizational 
job-control linkages. Such basic research regarding both public- 
sector and private-sector multilocational organizations can be 
carried out relatively economically by using the simple procedure 
reported in this article. 
As a corollary, regional planners cannot continue to operate 
under the premise that income and employment opportunities will 
automatically expand rapidly in a growth center and its surround- 
ing region merely as a consequence of the implementation of 
explicit locational decisions, such as the growth-center assign- 
ment of a new manufacturing facility or government office. 
Instead, because of the high degree of interdependence found 
within a modern post-industrial system of cities, and in parti- 
cular because of the scale of nonlocal growth transmission that 
normally follows from any major investment or activity expan- 
sion, where possible, there should be some minimal coordination 
of the explicit and implicit locational decision making of both 
private corporations and government organizations. That is, the 
attainment of regional income- and employment-creation goals 
requires that there be some effort to directly influence the 
interurban growth-transmission linkages that come into being as 
a result of goods and service purchases, contract and subcon- 
tract awards, and miscellaneous capital allocations. 
Finally, because of the shifts in occupational structure 
occurring in advanced economies, and especially because of the 
increasing relative importance of information processing office 
and service activities, the growth-center and the growth-pole 
schemes cannot continue to focus on the manufacturing sector and 
on the input-output linkages it supposedly generates in nearby 
areas. In short, much growth-pole and regional development 
planning needs to be reexamined in terms of information link- 
ages rather than physical input-output linkages. In this con- 
nection, the Boise City SMSA is of some interest. The conven- 
tional wisdom shared by regional planners and academics often 
says that the smaller and intermediate-size metropolitan complexes 
usually selected as growth centers are too small to provide the 
external economies and services necessary for the successful 
operation of high-level administrative and management functions. 
If four large business organizations with nationally dispersed 
units and foreign operations can cluster their headquarters in 
the Boise City SMSA, with its comparatively remote location in 
the US-Canadian system of cities, why is it not possible to 
concentrate important private- or public-sector office functions 
in designated growth centers that fall into the 100,000 to 
250,000 population range? 
Note f o r  Figures  1-9: 
C i r c l e s  a r e  propor t ional  t o  t h e  number of jobs. Unavoidably, 
t h e r e  were some d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s  i n  t h e  q u a l i t y  of d a t a  provided 
by the  surveyed organizat ions .  In  same ins tances  it was neces- 
s a r y  t o  make place-by-place employment e s t ima tes  based on c r i t e r i a  
such a s  ou tpu t ,  s a l e s ,  and production capac i ty .  Consequently, 
t h e r e  is  a  margin of e r r o r  of 1 0 0  o r  more f o r  some of t h e  l a r g e r  
employment t o t a l s  shown i n  Figures 1-9 and i n  Table 4 .  
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Figure 5. US and Canadian metropolitan complexes with jobs controlled by multilocsltional 
business organizations headquartered in the Phoenix SHSA, 1974-1975. 

Figure 7. Jobs controlled in nonhinterland smaller cities and towns by multilocational 
business organizations headquarteredin the Boise City SMSA, 1974-75. 


Table 1. Aggregate job-control characteristics of multilocational business organizations with 
headquarters in selected metropolitan complexes of the western United States, 1974-75. 
Metropolitan Complex 
San Francisco- Seattle- Portland Phoenix Honolulu Boise City San Diego 
Oakland-San Jose ~ a c o m a ~  SMSA SMSA SMSA SMS A SMSA 
Number of multiloca- 
tional organizationsC 
Total estimated 
employmentd 
Employment accounted 
for by survey: 
local 
percent 
f oreigne 
percent 
mnlocal within the 
US-Canadian system 
of cities9 
percent 
See following page for footnotes. 
Table 1 footnotes: 
a San Francisco-Oakland SMSA plus San Jose SMSA. 
b~eattle SMSA plus Tacoma SMSA. 
C~ncludes all locally based organizations with approximately 
400 or more employees; does not include organizations having 
divisional or subsidiary head offices in the selected metropolitan 
complexes, but elsewhere located organization-wide headquarters. 
'~ot including employment associated with joint ventures 
and partially-owned subsidiaries. 
e~xclusive of Canada. See footnote g below. 
'Most of the comparatively large number of foreign jobs 
controlled from Honolulu involve plantation agriculture--the 
initial primary function of AMFAC, of Castle 6 Cooke, and of 
other major Hawaiian corporations before they became highly 
diversified conglomeratas. 
g ~ h e  US and Canada are treated here as having a single system 
of cities, despite the somewhat retarding effect the border 
between the two countries has on urban-economic interaction 
( S h o n s ,  1974a). This gesture is largely based on the fact that 
US-based corporations own a larger share of the assets of all 
Canadian manufacturing, petroleum and natural-gas, and mining and 
smelting activities than do organizations based in Canada itself. 
The volume of highly business-oriented air-passenger traffic 
between Toronto and New York is comparable to that between Toronto 
and Montreal, Canada's two largest metropolitan complexes. Like- 
wise, the air-passenger traffic between Vancouver--Canada's third- 
ranking metropolitan complex--and Toronto and Montreal is com- 
parable in size to that between Vancouver and the Los Angeles and 
San Francisco Bay Atea metropolitan complexes. 
Table 2. Location, by general category, of US and Canadian jobs controlled by multilocational 
business organizations with headquarters in selected metropolitan complexes of the 
western United States, 1974-75. 
Estimated number of employees 
A 
- 
B - c - D E 
- 
All other metro- Metropolitan com- Nonhinterland Nonlocal total within 
politan complexes plexes outside of Hinterlandb smaller towns US-Canadian system of 
hinter landa and cities cities 
San Francisco- 
Oakland-San .loseC 
(percent) 
(percent) 
~eattle-~acoma~ 
(percent) 
Portland SMSA 
(percent) 
Phoenix SMSA 
(percent) 
Honolulu SHSA 
(percent) 
Boise City SHSA 
(percent) 
San Diego SHSA 
(percent) 
See following page for footnotes. 
Table 2 footnotes: 
%etropolitan hinterlands defined with the assistance of 
Borchert (1972) and other sources in accord with central-place 
theory principles. 
b~ncompasses some metropolitan complexes included in 
column A. The Honolulu, Boise City, and San Diego hinterlands 
contain no metropolitan units. 
 an Francisco-Oakland SMSA plus San Jose SMSA. 
$ercentage total arrived at by s-ing the percentages 
listed under columns B, C, and D. 
e~ased on the inclusion of jobs controlled by San Francisco 
Bay Area business organizations in the hinterlands of Seattle- 
Tacoma and Portland. The nesting of the Seattle-Tacoma and 
Portland hinterlands into that of San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose 
is based on inter alia, the smaller population class, or 
lower order, of the Washington and Oregon metropolitan complexes. 
This results in an extrdely liberal delineated hinterland for 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose: one reason for this is that the 
Seattle-Tacoma hinterland has been defined as encompassinq 
Alaska as well as all of the state of Washington (except for Clark 
County which belongs to the Portland SMSA), northern Idaho, and 
northeastern Oregon. 
'~eattle SMSA plus Tacoma SMSA. 
g~redominately composed of plantation agriculture employment. 
Most of the comparatively large number of foreign jobs controlled 
from Honolulu involve plantation agriculture--the initial primary 
function of AMFAC, of Castle and Cooke, and of other major 
Hawaiian corporations before they became highly diversified 
conglomerates. 
Table 3. Location, by size of metropolitan complex, of US and Canadian jobs controlled by 
multilocational business organizations with headquarters in selected metropolitan 
complexes of the western United States, 1974-75. 
Estimated number of employees 
- 
First and second order Third-order national Intermediate-sized metrowlitan Lesser metro- Metr0~0litan 
national centers centers (pop. 1.0- centers politan centers total- 
(pop. > 2.6 rnilli~n)~ 2.6 million)" (POP- (POP. 500,000- 250,000- (pop. < 250,000) 
San Francisco- 
Oakland-San ~ o s e b  
(percent) 
~eattle-~acoma~ 
(percent) 
Portland SMSA 
(percent) 
Phoenix SMSA 
(percent) 
Honolulu SMSA 
(percent) 
Boise City SMSA 
(percent) 
San Diego SMSA 
(percent) 
See following page for footnotes. 
Table 3 footnotes: 
%ae Borchert 's (1 972) definition of 'f irst" , "second", 
and 'third-order" US metropolitan centers. Metropolitan complexes 
assigned to size categories on the basis of 1970 (US), and 1971 
(Canada) populations. 
b ~ a n  Francisco-Oakland SMSA plus San Jose SHSA. 
'~eattle SMSA plus Tacoma SMSA. 
Table U. Jobs control lad a t  70 malor me t rowl i t an  cmplexea by multi- 
l oca t iona l  buslnemm orqanlzat lons based i n  seven r e a t e r n  US 
met rowl i t an  e l u e m .  1 9 7 ~ - 7 5 . ~  
E s t i m t e d  nwnbcr of employees con t ro l l ed  froma 
Ssn Sea t t l e -  Port land Phoenlx B o ~ s e  Honolulu San Total  fo r  
P ranc~sco-  Tacoma SnSA SMSA City SnSA Dleqo se lec ted  
1970 Oakland- SMSA SMSA centera 
population san ~ 0 . 0 ~  
LD. Anq I.' 
ChrcaqoZ 
~ h l l a d e l p h l a ~  
Detroit SMSA ---.-~ 
san Francisco- 
Oakland-San Joseb 
Flo.tonh 
waahmqton D.C. 
SUSA 
Cleveland-Akron' 
Toronto3 
st. b u i s  SMA 
Pit tsburgh SMSA 
Dallas-Port Worth 
B a l t m o r e  SnSA 
Routon  SUSA 
I l n n e a p o l ~ a -  
S t .  Paul *A 
uiamzk 
Seattle-T~COU' 
~ i n c ~ n n a t l l  
Atlanta  SMSA 
nilwaukeem 
San Dlego SnSA 
Buffalo SnSA 
Kansas C ~ t y  SUSA 
Denver SMSA 
Rlvers~de-San 
Bernadlno SUSA 
Indianapolim SnSA 
Tampa-st. 
Petersburq SUSA 
vancouverl 
N.) Orleans SUSA 
Columbus SUSA 
Portland SMSA ~- 
Phoenix SUSA 
Rochester SUSA 
Provzdence SnSA 
San Antonio SnSA 
Lou i sv i l l e  SnSA 
nar t fo rdn  
Dayton SUSA 
.Yezaphis S M  
Sacramento SnSA 
Albany-Schenectady- 
Troy SnSA 
Birnlnqham SnSA 
Toledo SnSA 
23 .537  
92,346 
11,863 
11.918 
1 .517  
XXX 
U.760 
8.326 
2,923 
3 4 2  
2,005 
3.397 
820  
13,213 
3,176 
8.561 
876  
1,645 
11,445 
1 ,539  
3 .187  
1 .652  
11,516 
2,206 
11.588 
8 .105  
18,282 
1 .121  
855 
9,583 
4 .137  
1.035 
21,939 
5,019 
484 
983 
1.385 
1,766 
1133 
154  
2,016 
16,020 
U75 
1.270 
437 
2,180 
3.603 
564 
7,115 
179 
6.U28 
110 
11  1 
9 6 
2 
227  
768 
U 8 
654 
114  
180  
410 
64 1 
XXX 
376  
919  
7 9 
217 
5 0 
1 .679  
608 
12U 
7 8 
113 
1.669 
26 1 
121 
4.046 
250 
7 5 
58 
2 1 
6 2 
81  
1 2  
67 
429 
4 8 
39 
232 
3.837 
3,301 
4 .837  
2,978 
1,395 
2.237 
1,223 
785 
1,407 
318 
380  
909  
1.099 
1.917 
1 7 1  
1.116 
3 ,371  
1,006 
387 
577  
803 
503 
3u9  
182  
1.442 
7 9 5  
8 3 
3 8 1  
1 3 2  
2U5 
507  
232  
590  
XXX 
9 2 
41 
282 
583 
6 2 
127  
1,161 
31 7 
114  
300  
7 3 
98  
5.383 
843  
u 2 
207  
1 .U5U 
64 
3 5 
8 5 
3 6 
21 1 
9 8 
462  
3 
555  
169  
9 
397  
8 7 
219 
57 
XXX 
260 
343 
2.15u 
3 6 
257  
1 7  
39  
266  
830 
49 
2 6 
192  
25  
132  
U 
SyraCUse SMSA 
Honolulu SnSA 
Northeast 
Permsylvanla SUSA 
Jacksonv i l l e  SnSA 
Allentom- 
Bethlehem SnSA 
Char lo t t e  SnSA 
Tulsa SnSA 
- v -  > -  --- 
Holvoke SnSA 
m a h i  SnSA 
Grand R.m~ds SnSA 
787  2 
7 5 0  290 xxx 
Orlando i n S ~  U53.270 636 113  8 5 350 372 60  981  2 .597  
Lanslnq SMSA U24.271 221  26 u99  761 
Ralelqh-Durham SUSA 418 .841  220 811  258 191 115 1 1,526 
Fresno SnSA 113.053 5,183 176  8 2 1123 U l  35U 142  6 .601  
Knoxv111e SnSA 409.UO9 3 .360  29 UI 3 u9 1 .582  
Wlchlta SMSA 389.352 698 8.768 1 5  60  2 36 9 .609  
Ploblle SnSA 376,690 173 8 50  110  2 
Baton Rouge SnSA 375,628 1.u88 8 1 .180  59  
See f o l l w l n q  paqe f o r  footnotea.  
Table 4 footnotes: 
%S and Canadian metropolitan complexes with jobs controlled 
by multilocational business organizations headquartered in the 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Joae metropolitan complex, 1974-75. 
b ~ a n  Francisco-Oakland SMSA plus San Jose SMSA. 
C~eattle SMSA plus Tacoma SMSA. 
(kew York-New Jersey SCA plus Bridgeport SMSA plus 
Norwalk SMSA plus Stamford SMSA. The combination of metropolitan 
areas into larger metropolitan complexes in Tables 1 through 4 
is baaed upon heavily overlapping commuting patterns and the 
sharing of major airport facilities. 
'LOB Angeles-Long Beach SMSA plus Anaheim-Santa Ana- 
Garden Grove SMSA. 
'chicago-  or the astern Indiana SCA. 
g~hiladelphia SMSA plus Wilmington, Del. , SNSA. 
%oston SMSA plus Brockton SMSA plus Lawrence-Haverhill SMSA 
plus Lowell SMSA. 
i Cleveland SMSA plus Akron SMSA. 
1 97 1 population datum. 
'~iami SMSA plus Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood SMSA. 
l~inncinnati SMSA plus Hamilton-Middletown SMSA. 
%ilwaukee SMSA plus Racine SMSA. 
"Rartford SMSA plus New Britain SMSA. 
Osee also note to Figures 1 to 9(p. 18 I .  
Table 5. Deviation of job-control linkages from central-place-theory and hinterland assumptions 
of interurban growth transmission: based on multilocational buoiness organizations 
headquartered in selected western US metropolitan complexes, 1974-75. 
Percentage of all nonlocal Percentage of metropolitan Ratio of nonhinterland Ratio of all nonhinter- 
job-control linkages within job-control linkages within metropolitan linkages land linkages to all 
the US-Canadian system of the US-Canadian system of to all hinterland hinterland linkages 
cities unaccounted for by cities unaccounted for by linkages 
Christallerian central- Christallerian central- 
place theory place theory 
San Francisco- 
Oakland-San Josee 
~eattle-~acomag 
Portland SHSA 
Phoenix S M S A ~  
Honolulu SHSA 
Boise City SHSA 
San Diego 
See following page for footnotes. 
Table 5 footnotes: 
a Based on all jobs controlled in nonhinterland smaller towns 
and cities (see column D, Table 2 1 ,  plus jobs controlled in all 
nonhinterland metropolitan complexes belonging to the same or 
larger population size classes (see appropriate columns, Table 3 ) .  
b~ased on all jobs controlled in nonhinterland smaller towns 
and cities plus all jobs controlled in every size class of non- 
hinterland metropolitan complex (see columns B and D, Table 2). 
C~ased on all jobs controlled in metropolitan complexes 
belonging to the same type of larger population size classes 
Csee appropriate columns, Table 3) . 
d~ased on all jobs controlled in every size class of non- 
hinterland metropolitan complex (see column B, Table 2). 
e San Francisco-Oakland SMSA plus San Jose SMSA. 
f~ased on the inclusion of jobs controlled by San Francisco 
Bay Area business organizations in the hinterlands of Seattle- 
Tacoma and Portland. The nesting of the Seattle-Tacoma and 
Portland hinterlands into that of San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose 
is based on inter alia, the smaller population class, or 
lower order, of the Washington and Oregon metropolitan complexes 
This results in an extremely liberal delineated hinterland for 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose; one reason is that the 
Seattle-Tacoma hinterland has been defined as encompassing 
Alaska as well as all of the state of Washington (except Clark. 
County which belongs to the Portland SMSA), northern Idaho, and 
northeastern-most Oregon. 
'~eattle SMSA plus Tacoma SMSA. 
'~urin~ the early 1970s the Phoenix SMSA probably had the 
most rapid relative growth rate of all major US metropolitan 
complexes. By 1974 it had an estimated population of 1.2 million. 
For this reason Arizona's largest metropolitan center was assigned 
to the "third-order national center" size category (Table 3) 
when computing columns I and 111. Had the Phoenix SMSA been 
assigned to the 500,000-999,999 size class on the basis of its 
official 1970 population (967,5221, then the percentage of 
deviating linkages would have risen to 71.9 in column I and 70.2 
in column 111. 
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